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Civil Procedure
Henry G. McMahon*
Two cases' decided by the Supreme Court during the past
term deferred the answer to an important and interesting question of mineral law to a later date; but the action of the court
in remanding the cases for the impleading of parties not joined
initially answered an important procedural question on which
attorneys heretofore have held divergent views.
In both cases, the mineral lessee sought a declaratory judgment 2 against its mineral lessor to determine the proportionate
royalty due each from the production on a 177.60 acre unit established by the conservation department. Prior to the establishment of the conservation unit, the lands owned by each defendant
had been included in a contractually-pooled unit of 160 acres
established by the mineral lessee, but only 101.13 acres originally
included in the contractual unit had been included in the conservation unit. In each case, the plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment holding that the royalty due for these 101.13 acres
must be paid to the owners of all of the acreage in the 160 acre
contractual unit. Both the trial court and the intermediate appellate court 3 sustained the contention of the defendants that
the establishment of the conservation unit had the effect of
supplanting and superseding the contractual unit, and that all
royalty due from the latter should be distributed to the owners
of all lands therein in proportion to their respective holdings.
Judge Tate dissented from the majority holding of the Court
of Appeal for the Third Circuit, on the ground that since the
interests of the owners of land in the contractual unit not inwere
cluded in the conservation unit were directly affected, they
4
indispensable parties to the action and should be joined.
Under writs of review, the Supreme Court accepted Judge
Tate's reasoning. The judgments in both cases were set aside,
*Professor and sometime dean, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Jones, 241 La. 661, 130 So.2d 408 (1961)
Same v. Edwards, 241 La. 676, 130 So.2d 413 (1961).
2. Under the provisions of the former LA. R.S. 13:4231 et seq. (1950), now
incorporated into LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDUBE art. 1871 et 8eq. (1960).
3. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Jones, 125 So.2d 640 (La. App. 1960)
Same v. Edwards, 125 So.2d 654 (La. App. 1960).
4. See 125 So.2d at 648.
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and the cases were remanded to the trial court for the joinder of
these indispensable parties.
The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, now incorporated
into the Code of Civil Procedure, has only one general provision
regulating the parties to an action brought thereunder. This
provides that "When declaratory relief is sought, all persons
shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding." 5'
This requirement of joinder of interested parties was held to
make applicable all of the rules of joinder of necessary and indispensable parties, now clarified and embodied in the new procedural code." Since the rights of the owners of land in the contractual unit not included in the conservation unit would be
directly affected by any judgment rendered, they were held to
be indispensable parties to the action.
Procedurally these decisions are both important and farreaching.
INTERVENTION

One of the most difficult tasks of any system of civil procedure is to provide a workable rule governing the juridical
interest required of a third person to permit him to intervene
in a pending action. Here, the difficulty is that of reaching the
happy medium between apparently conflicting requirementsa rule flexible enough to serve the interests of justice yet definite
enough to permit its effective application in the trial of cases.
Obviously in Louisiana, such a rule must be broader than either
the "community of interest" required for the cumulation of
actions by or against plural parties, 7 or the "interests affected
by the judgment" which determines necessary or indispensable
parties.8 Yet, to prevent interference with the administration
of justice by intermeddlers and rank interlopers, the privilege
of intervening must be restricted to those who have some juridical interest connected with or related to the pending action.
The former Code of Practice never enunciated the requirement of connexity which is the basis of the right to intervene
5. Former LA. R.S. 13:4241, now LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1880

(1960).
6. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 641-647 (1960).
7. Under id. arts. 463, 647.
8. Under id. arts. 641-646.
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in other civilian jurisdictions, but contented itself with a provision that "[i]n order to be entitled to intervene, it is enough
to have an interest in the success of either party, or an interest
opposed to both."9 Thus, the real test was left to the Louisiana
courts to supply; and the latter, influenced largely by AngloAmerican procedural principles, had held that "the interest required to authorize intervention must be a direct one by which
the [intervener] is to obtain immediate gain or suffer immediate
loss by the judgment which may be rendered between the original
parties." 0
In the redaction of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Louisiana State Law Institute made an extensive study of the problem,
and of the solutions provided both in Anglo-American and
civilian jurisdictions. In an effort to broaden, and thus increase
the usefulness of, the remedy of intervention, Article 1091 of
the Code of Civil Procedure provides that:
"A third person having an interest therein may intervene
in a pending action to enforce a right related to or connected
with the object of the pending action against one or more
of the parties thereto by:
"(1) Joining with plaintiff in demanding the same or
similar relief against the defendant;
"(2) Uniting with defendant in resisting the plaintiff's
demand; or
"(3) Opposing both plaintiff and defendant."
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Louisiana Public Serv. Com'n"
illustrates the extent to which the right to intervene has been
broadened by the new procedural code. In the trial court, the
plaintiff sought to revise upward certain increases in the rates
at which it sold natural gas to two local utilities in the New
Orleans area, and which had been granted by the Louisiana
Public Service Commission. Certain industrial consumers, who
had been permitted to intervene in the proceeding before the
commission, sought to intervene in the judicial review of the
commission's orders. To show a juridical interest in the pending
suit, these interveners alleged that they purchased large quanti9. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 390 (1870).
10. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Louisiana Public Serv. Com'n, 241 La. 687,
130 So.2d 652, 656 (1961).
11. 241 La. 687, 130 So.2d 652 (1961).
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ties of natural gas from one of the two local utilities supplied
by the plaintiff; that if the rates fixed by the commission were
increased, this increase would be passed on to the interveners
and others by the local utility; and that hence the interveners
had an interest in opposing the plaintiff's demand. The trial
court maintained exceptions to these interventions and dismissed
them, holding that the interveners had no interest in the pending action. The New Orleans Sewerage & Water Board, one of
these interveners, appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the dismissal of its intervention.
After reviewing the prior jurisprudence, the court summarized its position on the procedural point presented as follows:
"As we appreciate the record herein, the rate increase
allowed can be passed on to the Board by New Orleans Public
Service, Inc. It may eventually be done. But the evidence
does not establish that the transference is mandatory. It
seems clear that the Board will be affected only if further
rate action is taken by New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,
after the termination of this proceeding. Hence, the interest
shown by the Board is remote, indirect, and contingent.
"We conclude that the intervention of the Sewerage and
Water Board of New Orleans was properly dismissed." 12
As the case was tried in the court below prior to the effective
date of the new procedural code, the prior jurisprudential rule
referred to above was applicable. 13 And, since the intervener
would not have suffered immediate loss through the judgment
which might have been rendered between the parties, the court
had no alternative except to dismiss the intervention. Yet this
was a case where, if the Sewerage & Water Board had no remedy
by intervention, it would have had no remedy at all. The New
Orleans Public Service, like the plaintiff, is a public utility
legally entitled to a fair and reasonable return on its investment.
If the rates charged Public Service had been increased, realism
compels the conclusion that this increase ultimately would have
been passed on to its customers. But at this juncture, these
customers would not have been able to question the increase
granted to the plaintiff previously by the courts.
12. 130 So.2d at 657.
13. Under LA. ACTS 1960, No. 15, § 4(B) (2) (b).
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Under the broader rule of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
intervener's juridical interest to intervene to enforce a right
related to or connected with the object of the plaintiff's action
would appear to be clear.
EXCEPTIONS

Williams v. Marionneaux,14 involving very interesting points
of tort and procedural law, was one of the most important cases
decided during the past term. There, the plaintiff sued to recover damages caused by the negligence of one Blanchard,
alleged to have been an employee of the defendant. The latter,
in his answer, denied that Blanchard was his employee, alleged
that Blanchard was the owner of the truck involved in the
accident, and at the time was acting as an independent contractor. Defendant called Blanchard and his casualty insurer
in as third party defendants, praying for judgment over against
them for any amount for which judgment might be rendered
against the defendant. These third party defendants in turn
called in the plaintiff as a third party defendant, alleging that
plaintiff had compromised his claim against Blanchard and,
while reserving his rights against the defendant, had agreed to
hold Blanchard harmless against further liability because of the
accident.
After the last third party petitions had been filed, the defendant filed exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action
to plaintiff's petition, and on the trial thereof the compromise
agreement between plaintiff and Blanchard was introduced in
evidence without objection. The trial court sustained both exceptions; and this judgment was affirmed on appeal by the intermediate appellate court.
Under a writ of review, the Supreme Court overruled the
exception of res judicata on the ground that it did not meet the
code requirement that the two suits be between the same parties, 15 but affirmed the judgments of both courts maintaining
14. 240 La. 713, 124 So.2d 919 (1960).
15. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2286 (1870).

The compromise agreement was

pleaded as res judicata under the provisions of id. art. 3078 providing, in part,

that "Transactions [or compromises] have, between the interested parties, a force
equal to the authority of things adjudged."

In the course of its opinion on this point, the Supreme Court rendered a service
to Louisiana law in expressly overruling Muntz v. Algiers & G. St. Ry., 116 La.
236, 40 So. 688 (1906) and McKnight v. State, 68 So.2d 652 (La. App. 1953), both
of which had failed to apply LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2286 (1870). The note on the
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the exception of no cause of action. Since the alleged liability
of the defendant would have been purely a secondary one based
on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the plaintiff's release of
Blanchard was held to have effected the release of the defendant.
On both of the points decided, the opinion of the Supreme Court
is well reasoned and convincing. Unfortunately, there is some
language in the opinion which, if taken out of context, may cause
difficulty in the future. 6
While the facts of this case do not present, they at least
suggest, a related question of considerable importance to the
profession in this state. In this case, the employee and employer
were not joint tortfeasors, the employer being liable only secondarily for any negligence of the employee. But suppose this had
been a case where the plaintiff, with full reservation of his
rights against the other, had compromised his claim against the
first of two joint tortfeasors, and later sued the second. What
would be the effect of this compromise upon any judgment which
might be rendered against the second ?17
latter case in 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 901 (1954), by Donald J. Tate, former

Editor-in-Chief of the Review, is cited with approval. 130 So.2d at 922, n. 4.
16. The first of these is the reference to the propriety of pleading a judicial
estoppel, rather than res judicata, under factual situations similar to those in the
Muntz and McKnight cases. 130 So.2d at 922, 924, n. 7. In a civilian jurisdiction
there is neither a need of, nor room for, the common law doctrine of estoppel by
judgment. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958
Term - Civil Procedure, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 388, 390-393 (1959). A
more legitimate rationale for the holdings in these two cases is that the plaintiffs
had no cause of action in the second cases because the judgments in the first cases
deprived the defendants of any possible subrogatory rights to enforce indemnity
against the parties primarily bound.
The second of these is the statement by the court that, in the principal case, the
plaintiff had but a single cause of action against both employee and employer.
130 So.2d at 923. This statement gives recognition to the extremely broad concept
of the "cause of action" at common law, which treats as a single cause of action
in tort cases "one actionable wrong permitting of but one recovery." See American
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 13 (1951) ; Baltimore S.S. Co. v.
Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927). The civilian concept of the "cause of action"
is much narrower, and would regard a suit against employee and employer as
cumulating two distinct actions -one against each. On this point, see Preliminary
Statement to Chapter 2, "Cumulation of Actions," Title I1 of Book I, LA. CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1960). A retention of the common law concept of the "cause
of action" will produce future difficulties in the areas of cumulation of actions,
joinder of parties, and the splitting of the cause of action. Norton v. Crescent
City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La. 135, 150 So. 855 (1933) and P. Olivier & Sons v.
Board of Com'rs, 181 La. 802, 160 So. 419 (1935), relied on by the court to sustain its position that plaintiff here had but a single cause of action against both
employee and employer, may be differentiated readily. In the first case, the first
and any second suit would have been between the same parties. In the second
case, both suits were between the same parties. Both cases involved different items
of damage in the same cause of action. Compare LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
art. 425 (1960).
17. The reason why the Louisiana State Law Institute recommended creation
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SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of Louisiana for years has held that
when a decision of an intermediate appellate court is reviewed
under a writ of certiorari, the judgment under review may be
modified only to grant relief to the applicant for the writ. The
judgment of the court of appeal cannot be revised so as to grant
relief to any other party.' 8
Two cases decided during the past term demonstrate some
of the unfortunate aspects of this jurisprudential rule. 9 Jones
v. Hogue2° presented a difficult problem of dividing among the
adjacent riparian owners the alluvion formed over the years
by the Mississippi River. The trial judge adopted one method
of apportionment, the court of appeal another, and the Supreme
Court held a third formula to be proper. The impact of the
jurisprudential rule upon any modification of the judgment of
the court of appeal is made clear from the following language
of the Supreme Court's opinion:
"As we have pointed out, no actual survey has been made
or dividing line established in this case, and we are not able
to say what frontage or what area the riparian owners in
this case will receive when the alluvion is divided as ordered
above. However, when the apportionment is made in accordance with our orders, relators are not to receive any less area
than that given to them by the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, for respondents did not apply to this court for a
writ, and relators should not be penalized because of their
application.

' '2 1

of the full substantive right to enforce contribution between joint tortfeasors
through an amendment of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2103 (1870) was to have the rights
and obligations of joint tortfeasors inter sese regulated by the same substantive
rules which govern the similar rights and duties of conventional solidary debtors.
Compare LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2100-2107, 2203 (1870).
Thus, when an injured party compromises his claim against one joint tortfeasor, even though he may reserve his rights against the second, the release given
the first has the effect of reducing the claim against the second by one half. LA.
CIvIL CODE art. 2203 (1870). By releasing the first, the injured party has deprived the second of his subrogatory right to enforce contribution against the
first, and to this extent has released the second.
18. May Finance Co. v. Nagy, 223 La. 816, 66 So.2d 860 (1953) ; Speed v.
Page, 222 La. 529, 62 So.2d 824 (1952).; Washington v. Holmes & Barnes, 200 La.
787, 9 So.2d 35 (1942) and the list of cases cited therein.
19. Jones v. Hogue, 241 La. 407, 129 So.2d 194 (1960) ; Rogillio v. Cazedessus,
241 La. 186, 127 So.2d 734 (1961).
20. 241 La. 407, 129 So.2d 194 (1960).
21. 129 So.2d at 203.
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In Rogillio v. Cazedessus 22 the court of appeal affirmed judgments against, inter alia, two casualty insurers, for damages
sustained in an automobile accident by the plaintiffs. Under a
writ of review granted at the instance of one of these insurers,
the Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to it. One of the
most hotly contested issues in the intermediate appellate court
had been as to the quantum to which the plaintiffs were entitled,
and in the Supreme Court the plaintiffs argued strenuously that
the judgments should be increased. As the plaintiffs had not
applied for a writ of review, the Supreme Court refused to consider this issue.
This type of procedural problem is by no means new, since
both of these cases might have arisen at any time during the
past three or four decades. Perhaps a more typical problem
would be presented where the intermediate appellate court reversed judgments against the defendant and the third party
defendant, and the plaintiff applied for a writ of review on the
very last day. The defendant (and third party plaintiff) would
have been completely satisfied with the decision of the court of
appeal, and really had no right to apply for a writ. Yet, if the
Supreme Court reverses this judgment of the intermediate appellate court, the defendant (and third party plaintiff) will be
unable to pass this judgment, or any part thereof, on to the third
party defendant.
While not new, these problems have been rendered more
acute, and their potential frequency has been increased, by recent procedural developments. Three factors are chiefly responsible: (1) the adoption of third party practice; the increase,
both in number and in complexity, of the cases now being handled
by the courts of appeal; and (3) the jurisprudential development,
retained by the Code of Civil Procedure, of more liberal rules
of joinder, both unqualified and in the alternative.
The Appellate Reorganization Committee of the Judicial
Council is now studying a proposed solution of these problems,
to be effected through the adoption of a new Section 8 of Rule
XIII of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 28 This proposes to create
22. 241 La. 186, 127 So.2d 734 (1961).
23. Reading as follows:
"Section 8. When a writ of review has been granted by the court, any respondent who desires to have the decree of the Court of Appeal modified, revised, or
reversed in any respect other than that sought by the petitioner, may file an
answer to the petition for the writ. This answer shall state the relief desired, and
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a new procedural device, the "answer to the petition for a writ
of review," somewhat analogous to, but considerably broader

than, the answer to the appeal.

24

While not completely free of

any possible doubt, the writer believes that the proposed amend25
ment to the Supreme Court Rules would be constitutional.
REAL ACTIONS

Erath Sugar Co. v. Broussard26 reflects the commendably
liberal attitude of the Supreme Court in procedural matters.
Both the trial court and the intermediate appellate court had
maintained an exception of no cause of action to the plaintiff's
petition, on the ground that it had no right to invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act ;27 since the facts alleged showed that the
petitory action was available. Both of these decisions were
shall be filed on or before the return day on the writ fixed by this court. Before
this answer is filed, a copy thereof must be delivered or mailed to the petitioner
for the writ and all other respondents; and verification of such delivery or mailing
must appear from the affidavit of the respondent filing the answer, or of his attorney.
"An answer to a petition for a writ which complies with the requirements of
this section shall 'be deemed the equivalent of a timely cross-application for a writ
of review which has been granted by the court. Under authority thereof, the court
may grant any relief prayed for therein, whether against the petitioner for the writ
or against any other respondent.
"As used in this Section 8, the word 'respondent' includes any party (other
than the petitioner for a writ of review) who appeared in the case in the Court
of Appeal, either through brief or oral argument, or both."
24. It would have to be broader than the answer to the appeal in order to
permit modification or revision of the judgment of the court of appeal as between
respondents.
25. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10, provides that "The Supreme Court has control
of and general supervisory jurisdiction over all inferior courts." In a long line
of decisions, the Supreme Court has properly held that the only limitations on its
exercise of supervisory power are those expressly imposed by the Constitution, and
those which are self-imposed by the court in the interests of orderly procedure and
the efficient administration of justice. The Constitution further provides that,
when a decision of an intermediate appellate court is reviewed by the Supreme
Court, the latter has "the same power and authority as if [the case] had been
carried directly by appeal" to the Supreme Court. The only language of the Constitution which, by any stretch of the imagination, might be construed as a limitation with respect to the proposed amendment of the Rules is the proviso in Article
VII, § 11, "that the Supreme Court shall in no case exercise the power conferred
by this Article unless the application shall have been made to the court or to one
of the justices thereof within thirty days after a rehearing shall have been refused
by the Court of Appeal." However, in every case in which the Supreme Court
would permit an answer to the petition for a writ of review to be filed, of necessity
there would have been a prior compliance with this constitutional requirement.
Since, after granting the writ, the Supreme Court has the same jurisdiction over
the case as if it had been appealed directly to it, certainly it has jurisdiction to
grant full and complete relief to all parties before it, and should not be limited to
the granting of relief only to the applicant for the writ.
26. 240 La. 949, 125 So.2d 776 (1961).
27. The former LA. R.S. 13:4231 et seq. (1950), the provisions of which have
now been incorporated into LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 1871-1883 (1960).

CIVIL PROCEDURE

379

based on the rule of Burton v. Lester,28 that the remedy provided
by this statute could not be invoked by any litigant to whom
another adequate remedy was available.
Under a writ of review, the Supreme Court reversed. Even
though the plaintiff's petition had recited that the action was
based on the Declaratory Judgment Act, his prayers for both
declaratory and specific relief characterized the action as a petitory one. On this ground, the exception was overruled and the
case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

